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AGE DISCRIMINATION, THE EEOC
AND THE XEROX CORPORATION
Donald F. H arvey
Richard A. Wald

Introductio n
A sharp increase in employee complaints a nd litigation involving the issue
of age discrimination is forci ng huma n resource managers to become more
aware of this relatively new pro ble m area. We 1-.now that there will be a , ignificant increase in the protected age groups (40 and o lder) in the next decade. In this paper, we examme the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), the implications for the human resource manager, a nd the argument for tightenmg present regulatory actions in this area.
In 1967, Congress passed the Age Di scriminat io n in Employment l\ct,
enacting a mandate that no person up to age 65 be presumed incompetent
based solely upon age. The purpose of the act was "to promote the emplo,ment of older persom ba ed on their abilit, rather than age; to prohibit arburary age discnm111at 1on in employment" (U.S. Congress, Senate Hearing,
1987). The Act was amended in 1978 to e,tend t he upper limit or the protected age group to age 70. I\ further amendment 111 1986 amended the Act
to elimmate mandatory retirement fo r those employees 111 all but a few de,1gnated pro fess1ons.
In 1979, Congress gave enforcement aut honty 10 the Eq ual Employment
Opportunity Com mission (l:.EOC) to make certain employees' rights are protected. It 1s in this area, the legal enforcement of the \ ct, that 1s ue, and
apparent "1olauo ns appear a nd complicate enforcement. The a uthors examine this area 111 greater depth and parucularly focus on the employment ac.uons of the Xerox Corporauon from 1980 through 19 3.
Actio n<, of the Xero, Corpo ration
In 1984, the EFOC found increasmg support to a ll allegations that '<ero,
had, during reduc11ons 111 force smce 1980, termmated profess1011ah on the
basis of their age. Documents and testimony b, former '< ero, e,ecut1\ es indicated the compan) had implemented a deliberate corporate-directed poh C) to replace se111or, higher-paid employee, as a co t-cuttmg measure.
From 1980 through 1983, EEOC 1mest1gators no ted the follO\\ lllg releva111 details:
I . During this period, Xerox terminated b) \Oluntary or involuntar) RIFS
(reduction in force) 2,598 ,alaried per,onnel \\ ho were 40 or more at termination, and hired 22,768 new e mployees 111 vario us job catego ries.

2. From I 980 to 1982, the ratio o f new employee hired to employees terminated as a fu nction of age changed significantly . ewspapers carried
advertisements seel-.ing applicants for positio ns from \\ hich o lder employees had been laid off or had taken early re tirement when told thei r
a lternative wa to be laid off or fired.

3. EEOC attorneys found that Xerox had conducted several red uctions in
force ince May, 1980. The investigating attorneys reached the j udgment
t~at the criteria used for terminations were clearly non-objective, a rbitrary, and appeared to be subjective and not job related (U.S. Congress, Senate Hearing, 1987, 168, 522, 548-553).
Although the EEOC Associate General Counsel recommended that EEOC
file a lawsuit against Xerox, the enforcement agency issued a news release
in _February, _1985, stating its intention to move away from a policy of pur5umg complamts against large companies or industries, and mstead to foc us
on discrimination dealing with specific indiv1duab. EEOC Commissioner
Webb stated that "compensation should go only to proven victims of discrimination, not to entire classes" (Senate Hearing, 174-175).
In March, 1983, Jules Lusardi, a former Xerox sales representative who
was terminated by the company after I5 years of service, filed a class action
sun against the compan 1 based upon an alleged age-biased corporate policy
on a nat1onal basis. Mr. Lusardi was Jo111ed by 1,300 respondents who optedin during the initial notice. This case is still pending on appeal, although in
1984 the plaintiffs were awarded com and attorne; 's fees (Lusardi v. Xero,, 747 f. 2d 1984).

Voluntar} v~. lmoluntar} RI F
While the ADEA has made it clear that mandatory earl; retirement is unta,\ ful, it is equall} clear that Congress has not prohibited employees from
,·oluntaril} choosing early retirement. Instead, the primary goal of the ADEA
is to create a climate ol free choice between continu111g in employment as
long as one \\!Shes and 1s able, or retiring on adequate income with opportunities for meaningful acti,ities. Thus, a program of voluntar} early retirement
incenti,es that facilitates free choice by allowing some employees to retire
comfonabl} and to pursue neglected professional or personal interests, is
a legal retirement program.
As the EEOC has noted, whether such a reurement 1s actually voluntar},
111 an; meaningful sense, is an c,er-present issue in man 1 age discrimination
cases. "Incentive'' plans are generall 1 offered in a climate of economic uncertainty. Employees ma; believe - often ,, ith some reason
that their
choice 1s not between earl; retirement and work, but between early retirement and layoff. For example, in Bartman v. Alli.5-Chalmers Corp., plaintiffs successfully alleged constructive discharge on the ground that they elected
early retirement because they believed their only alternative was layoff and
the employer failed to advise them of the correct interpretation.
The issue here is not whether incentives per se violate the Act. They do
not. Rather, in the litigation context, the sole question is whether the specific plan is structured so that it meets the req uirements set down by Congress
in the ADEA by providing equal benefi ts regard less o f age or, if not, that
it falls within the specified exemption.
At Xerox, employees SO years of age and over wi th 10 years of service
qualified fo r increased retirement benefits if t hey took early retirement. The
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retirement pla n had two elements - ( I) a voluntary RI F (Reduction in Force),
a nd (2) an involuntary RI F. In either case, t he reduction in force primari ly
affected the ten ured, o lder, and higher salaried employees. Thus the employee
was given a choice: to opt for the early retirement pla n , or face the possibility of being slated for an involuntary reductio n (layoff). Naturally, most selected the vo lu ntary plan . The question surrou nding this is the method which
was used: docs this represent free choice, or is it a form of subtle coercion?
The EEOC findi ngs were that involuntary and voluntary terminations were
disproportionate in t he protected age group. Of the voluntary RIFs, 58%
were in t he protected age group, while in the involuntary category 27 .5%
of the employees were in this age group (Senate Hearing, 126-127, 521).
T he evidence from the EEOC hearings shows that from 1980 through 1983,
Xerox actually hired many more employees than the number who left. Rather
than reducing the total number of employees, Xerox was replacing older,
highly paid professionals with new hires who were paid less money. Several
high level Xerox officials have out lined independently a pauern of directives
issued to mid-level managers at meetings that they must get rid of the ''oldtimers" and that they must "counsel out" these employees. There is much
evidence, both anecdotal and documentary, that older workers were targeted for elimination from the Xerox workforce. Voluntary reductions in rorce
with an offer of severance benefits were always followed by an 1moluntary
R IF. O lder workers were "counseled" that failure to take the "voluntary"
offer \\ ould result in termmation with no benefits (Senate Hearing, 521 ).
Table I presents an analysis of the age of the Xero, workforce in the years
1980-83, compared to the average age of those replaced, either through voluntary or im oluntary plans. The last column indicates the number of standard
deviations from the expected proportion that the actual proportion of replaced
employees over 40 represents. The expected proportion is that proportion
that could be expected in the absence of discrimination.
Because the official company policy concerning reductions 111 force is to
choose those for termmauon on the basis of performance cvaluauon and
TABLt !
Comparison of Percent of Xerox Workforce Over 40
and Individuals Riffed, For Each Year 1980-83
YEAR

":. OF TOTAL COMPRISED OF PERSONS OVER .'..O
WORKFORCE
I!UF
VRIF
TRIF

# S.D.
USING TRIFS

1980

29.52

52.10

85.71

66.01

11 . 40

1981

30 . 96

42.47

46.34

4 5 .71

10.85

1982

32.11

43 . 36

80. 92

62 . 03

32. 24

1983

35 . 92

54 . 83

76 . 95

65.47

14.56

Source: See U. S . Congress, Senate Hearing, Hearing Before the
Special Committee on Aging, 1987,126 .
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tenure with Xerox, in the absence of age discrimination we would expect that
the majority of terminees would be newer, younger employees. Instead , the
EEOC found that not only were most terminees over 40, but that the number of terminees over 40 was consistently disproportionately large compared
to the ages of the total Xerox work force.
A series of interview by the EEOC confirmed these earlier fi ndings: few
of the terminations of these people categorized as "voluntary" by Xerox were
in fact rnluntar, in the tradn1onal sense. Although those terminations listed
as voluntary had in fact agreed to be term mated, 11 appeared that the agreements to leave were coerced.
For example, a 53 year old program engmeer refused an offer of voluntary early retirement He refused initially because there were several engineers
in his department 111 their thirties and w11h much less tenure, and according
lO the Xerox matrix of termmation criteria, these engmeers should have been
terminated before him.\\ hen he \,as told lO reconsider, he realized he would
be involuntaril} terminated and had no choice but to take the Bridge to Retirement Program. Soon afler he retired, several ne\, college graduates were hired
into his department
This example is typical of the EEOC testimon, of employees terminated
during 1980 through 1983. If they did not take a "rnluntary" RIF or the
Bridge to Reurement, they would soon be involuntarily terminated with lilt le or no severance pa}. \1oreover, the former employees usually stated that
they \,ere replaced by younger employees or by newly hired, recent college
graduates

Conclusion
Before the enactment of the ADEA, older employees ,,ere not covered
by federal law, and employers had the right to fire or force workers into
earlv retirement based upon age. Smee then, the A.DEA has been very effecti\e.in ob,ious age discrimination cases. However, 111 other cases, the employer has been able to prove a BFOQ (bona fide occupauonal qualification)
defense. \s the mean age of the working population mcreases, II will become mcreasmgl, difficult to weigh the rights of the employer against the
rights of older workers.
The foregomg events illustrate the difficult, of translat111g Congressional
intent into business practice. As Senator John Chafee noted while urging
EEOC to lighten its reins:
It seems that we ask the wrong quemon when we wonder if the ADEA
has been a success or failure. The law is undoubtedly a good one. T he
presumption that a person is incompetent solely beca use of his or h_er
age has no place in th is cou ntry . . . . But a law is o nly as good as its
enforcement ... (Senate Hearing, p. 13).
ft is no t clear that EEOC is do ing a good j o b in p rotecting o lder workers
fro m d iscr iminatio n . In recent years, EEOC has been slow to e n force laws
regarding age d isc rimina tio n . 1-< o r examp le, over on e-third o f_a ll litigation
proposals being forwarded to the Commission fo r a pproval rn volve cases
4
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that are already beyond the two-year statute of limitations. More guidance
from Congress 1s needed to guarantee employment discnmltlauon v1c11ms
the rights the law has granted them.
Recent reductions lll the number of (EEO) Commission employees aggra
vate the ex1stlllg problems. If one measures the quality or experience of i:; EOC
employees by their GS raungs, we fllld more GS-7's and S's and GS-1 'sand
fewer GS- 11 's and above.
Burden of Proof
Other orna1111auons ha"e also run into d1flicult) "ith the pro\l',1om ot
the /\DE/\ In assessing the respons1bilitv of proving a case in age disLriminat1on, the courts usuall) examltle three critical questions:
I. \\ as the program part of a bona fide employee benefit plan?

2.

\\as the plan de\eloped as a subterfuge to e\ade the purposes ol the
\D[:.t\?
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\\ as the dcc1s1on to accept earl> reuremcnt voluntarily entered into by
the \\Orl...er"1 (Sec 1\1cDonnell Dougla, \ Green, 411 U.S 792 (1973))
In one ob\tous case, a foreman told a 54-year-old truck dn\er applicant
that he (the foreman) \\Ould have to get "apprO\al from his bo,s" because
of the applicant's age In this case, the \\Orker \\as able to pr0\e age discrimination and ht, ab1lt1 1 to pertorm the \,or!.: required by the positwn (Sec
Hodgson \ Poole 1 ruck l llles. D C \la .. 1975).
hom the standpoint of the corporauon. a company ha, dutic, that go \,ell
beyond \\hat 1s commonl> kno\,n a, the "bu-,1ne,s econom1L function." ';ltlce
Job loss put, severe economical and emotional strams on families and can
causL great damage to the ,octal tabnc of a commu111t\. displacement should
be handlcd with the same \igor as given to gro\\lh ,trateg) and executi\e
compensation (Perl... 111,, I 98~) E,tensiH \ aim: Judgment\ and personal desire
of top managers enter 11110 these dccis1om, a nd as a rewlt, mana!,!ement mu,t
maintalll a degree ol detachment \\ hen C\ aluaung the conlltctmg demands
of laws and their impact upon company prof11ab1ltt\ (Anderson, 1986).
hH e,amplc, Phillip Houghton\\ a, I ired m 1973 b, the \le Donnell Douglas (orporation. rhe stated reason umatisfactor), performance 111 a ne\, assignment. Houghton \,as eertaltl the real reason \,as Im age - 52. He hired
a lawyer and sued !\le Donnell Douglas, under the l\ge D1scrim111at1on 111 Employment I\Lt. \n appeab court ruled that \ld)onnell Douglas had\ iolated
the federal la\, The 1986 amendments to the /\ge Di,criminauon 111 Emplo:,,ment Act eltmmate, \\ 1th certain c,ccpuons, the mandaton retirement
age for all workers.
Similarly, Pan American World /\in,ays m 1988 agreed to pay S 17 million to 100 former pilots\\ ho charged that the firm's policy of barring them
from sen ltlg as flight engineers after age 60 had no c1cnt1f1c bast~.
In 1986, fo r the first umc, age d1~cnm1na11on replaced race and se as the
single largest category or job bias complaims filed, \\Ith over 16°70 of all employment cases. In fiscal year 1986, with 17,000 age-related complaints filed

5

with the EEOC, the Com mission made on ly 82 recommendatio ns to litigate,
approximately o ne half of one percent of total complaints received. Staffi ng
problems ma) make this a continuing problem: for example, in the EEOC's
Office of the Genera l Council, Systematic Litigation Services, eight of seventeen trial attorney positions (47%) \\ere listed as vacant in a 1987 prepared
staffing chart (Senate Hearing, 98-100).
Unlike earlier Civil Rights La,\ , iolat1ons, the Federal age bias act pro, ides jury trials - thus, we may predict an mcrease 111 litigation as more
and more people reach the protected age group.

The Future
II Congress refuses to weaken the ADCA, and the courts continue to enforce the law, then corporate management \\Ill have 10 become more enlightened in taking precau11onary measures 10 protect itself against future ADEA
claims. By the year 2000, the nation's population of age 35 and older is expected to be approx11na1el, 7 0 million. Further, b) the year 2030, approximate!} 30 perce111 of the U.S. population will have reached the age of 55
years and older. It is inevnable that there ,,ill be mcreasing friction and conflict o,er the retention or reduction of older ,,orkers.
Three pred1ct10ns about age discrimination in the commg decade are
offered
I. -\ge discrimina11on bias ,,ill be an mcreasing problem for employers and
employees;
2 . J\n increa,e in litigation over these issues may be expected ; and
3. Further Congressional leg1sla11on to clarif; prese111 Congressional intent
and strengthen l::.EOC's enforcement of the Age Discrimmation in Employment \ct seems It kel}.
In conclusion, there 1s a need for further research into the issues and
problems of age discnm111a11on. Par11cularly helpfu l would be the development of a model 10 1de111ify the cn11cal personal, sit uauonal , and organizational factors that may mteract wnh age in detcrmming selection and re1e111ion
decisions
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